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O P I N I O N  
   
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 In this insurance coverage dispute, Kelman Bottles, LLC, and Kelman Glass, LLC, 
(collectively, Kelman) appeal (1) the District Court’s April 5, 2012, order granting 
summary judgment in favor of United States Fire Insurance Company (US Fire) and 
Continental Casualty Company (Continental) and (2) the District Court’s March 1, 2012, 
order denying Kelman’s motion for leave to add a bad faith claim against Continental.  
For the reasons that follow, we will (1) reverse the District Court’s April 5, 2012, order 
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granting summary judgment in favor of US Fire and Continental on Kelman’s breach of 
contract claims, (2) affirm the District Court’s April 5, 2012, order granting summary 
judgment in favor of US Fire on Kelman’s bad faith claim, and (3) reverse the District 
Court’s March 1, 2012, order denying Kelman’s motion to amend its complaint against 
Continental. 
I. Factual Background 
A. Kelman’s Furnace and the March 15, 2011, Incident 
The glass melting furnace at the Kelman factory typically contained about 220 
tons of molten glass stored at temperatures of 2300 to 2800 degrees farenheit.  On March 
15, 2011, at about 4:15 p.m., the north side of the furnace began to leak.  The leak rapidly 
turned into a catastrophic event, spewing molten glass for several hours.  The leak caused 
severe damage to the furnace and other equipment at the plant.   
At the time of the incident, the furnace had been in operation for about five years 
of its ten-year lifespan.  Prior to March 15, 2011, Kelman had experienced at least two 
other leaks in the furnace, although none was as severe.  Kelman’s furnace manager, 
Doug Hilliard, had expressed concerns about the condition of the furnace after leaks in 
April 2009 and June 2010.  In May 2009, Kelman hired a consultant to evaluate the status 
and stability of the furnace.  The consultant recommended several repairs.  Kelman 
performed most of the repairs but declined to undertake some repairs that it claimed were 
not done in the industry and might cause the furnace to wear out faster.   There is 
evidence in the record that all glass melting furnaces leak occasionally because their 
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design requires gaps to accommodate the large expansions and contractions associated 
with the high temperature of the molten glass.  
B. The Insurance Policies 
Kelman purchased two insurance policies to cover risks associated with the 
furnace:  (1) an “All Risk” policy with US Fire, and (2) an “Equipment Breakdown” 
policy with Continental.  Kelman’s “All Risk” policy with US Fire provided coverage for 
any “Covered Causes of Loss,” which coverage was defined as “Risks of Direct Physical 
Loss unless the loss is . . . excluded in Section B.”  The policy also contained an 
additional section titled “Additional Coverage Extensions,” which provided coverage for, 
among other things, loss or damage from “covered water or other liquid, powder or 
molten material damage loss.”  The policy did not state whether “loss or damage” in the 
Additional Coverage Extensions had the same meaning as “Covered Causes of Loss.”   
Kelman’s “Equipment Breakdown” policy with Continental provided coverage for 
any “‘Breakdown’ to ‘Covered Equipment.’”  The policy defined “Breakdown” as a 
“sudden and accidental direct physical loss to ‘Covered Equipment’ . . ..”  The policy’s 
definition of “Covered Equipment” included “furnaces, ovens and kilns.”   
C. Rejection of Kelman’s Insurance Claims by US Fire and Continental 
After the March 15, 2011, incident, Kelman filed claims with both US Fire and 
Continental.  On June 30, 2011, US Fire denied coverage to Kelman based on the 
policy’s Inherent Vice Exclusion, Wear and Tear Exclusion, and Design Defect 
Exclusion.  US Fire also reserved the right to deny coverage if the loss was not a 
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fortuitous event and noted that the loss might also be excluded under the Maintenance 
Exclusion or the Mechanical Breakdown Exclusion.    
Continental denied Kelman’s claim on June 14, 2011, on the grounds that a 
“Breakdown” did not occur within the definition of Kelman’s policy.  However, a report 
prepared by Continental during the course of its investigation noted that David Bizzak, an 
engineer hired by Continental to evaluate the cause of the incident, relayed to a 
Continental investigator that “based on the facts as described to him this was definitely an 
occurrence that was sudden and accidental.”1  Additionally, a Continental subrogation 
specialist noted in the claim file on April 12, 2011:  “Reviewed file notes and engineer 
report.  Loss was deemed sudden and accidental.”   
II. Procedural History 
On July 6, 2011, US Fire filed an action seeking a declaratory judgment that it had 
no obligation to insure Kelman for the damages and losses suffered in the March 15, 
2011, incident.  On August 23, 2011, Kelman filed a counterclaim asserting breach of 
contract and bad faith against US Fire.  On October 10, 2011, Kelman filed a Joinder 
Complaint against Continental asserting a breach of contract claim.  On February 21, 
2012—eleven days after the close of discovery and nine days before summary judgment 
motions were due—Kelman filed a motion to amend its claims against Continental to 
include a count of bad faith.  The District Court denied the motion on March 1, 2012. 
                                              
1
 Bizzak later testified that he would not have used those words, but, in any event, “it was 
a leak that was out of the realm of the normal.”   
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Both US Fire and Continental filed summary judgment motions, arguing that 
Kelman was not entitled to coverage under their respective policies and thus they did not 
breach their contracts with Kelman.  US Fire’s summary judgment motion also requested 
dismissal of Kelman’s bad faith counterclaim.  Kelman filed a cross-motion for summary 
judgment asserting that both US Fire and Continental were liable under their respective 
policies.  On April 5, 2012, the District Court granted the motions of US Fire and 




“We review the District Court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the 
same standard the District Court applied.  Summary judgment is appropriate where there 
is no genuine issue of material fact to be resolved and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.”  Alcoa, Inc. v. United States, 509 F.3d 173, 175 (3d Cir. 
2002) (citations omitted). 
 Kelman argues on appeal that the District Court erred by (1) granting summary 
judgment for US Fire and Continental on Kelman’s breach of contract claims, (2) 
granting summary judgment for US Fire on Kelman’s bad faith claim, and (3) denying 
Kelman’s motion for leave to amend the third party complaint against Continental to 
assert a claim of bad faith.   
 A. Breach of Contract Claims Against US Fire and Continental  
  1. Breach of Contract Claim Against US Fire 
                                              
2
 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and we have 
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
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 The District Court granted summary judgment for US Fire on the grounds that (1) 
the loss in question fell under the Inherent Vice Exclusion, and (2) because the loss in 
question fell under the Inherent Vice Exclusion, it also was not covered under the 
Additional Coverage Extensions.  Kelman argues that the District Court erred in granting 
summary judgment for US Fire on these grounds.  We agree.   
  a. Inherent Vice Exclusion 
The Inherent Vice Exclusion in the US Fire policy reads in pertinent part: 
B. Exclusions 
*  *  * 
2. We will not pay for loss or damage caused by or resulting from 
any of the following: 
 *  *  * 
d. (2) Rust, corrosion, decay, deterioration, hidden or 
latent defect, or any quality in property that causes it to 
damage or destroy itself. 
  
 The District Court found that the loss in question fell under the Inherent Vice 
Exclusion because the court identified the leaking of molten glass as the cause of the 
March 15, 2011, loss.  However, the leaking of molten glass is a common and natural 
occurrence in glass melting furnaces.  A catastrophic leak is not.  The March 15, 2011, 
loss was not due to the expected occasional leaking of molten glass but to the 
catastrophic leak of large amounts of molten glass.  Thus, the District Court erred in its 
conclusion that “because the loss sustained by Kelman occurred as result of molten glass 
escaping the furnace, and because Kelman admitted that molten glass was an inherent 
risk to operating the furnace, the loss falls within U.S. Fire’s inherent risk exclusion.” 
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This conclusion, under which any leak of molten glass would call for application of the 
Inherent Vice Exclusion, is too broad.
  
 
 Moreover, a glass furnace’s susceptibility to leaks is not the type of loss causation 
that should invoke the Inherent Vice Exclusion.  Even if the leaking of molten glass 
caused the loss, under this Court’s precedent, the loss still would not fall under the 
Inherent Vice Exclusion.  In GTE Corp. v. Allendale Mutual Ins. Co., we defined inherent 
vice as:  
. . . [A] cause of loss  . . . [that] does not relate to an 
extraneous cause but to a loss entirely from internal 
decomposition or some quality which brings about its own 
injury or destruction. . . .  In other words, the question is 
whether the insured property . . . contain[s] its own seeds of 
destruction . . . [or] was threatened by an outside natural 
force. 
 
372 F.3d 598, 611 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  In that 
case, we held that the Year 2000 (Y2K)-related data recognition problem in GTE 
Corporation’s computer systems constituted an inherent vice because the systems 
contained their own ‘seeds of destruction’—the two-digit date limitation, which 
precluded the systems from functioning properly on or after January 1, 2000.  Id.  Here, 
in contrast, the furnace’s susceptibility to leaks did not preclude it from functioning 
properly.  In fact, it is undisputed that leaks of molten glass from glass melting furnaces 
are common and natural; with proper maintenance and operation, a glass melting furnace 
will operate without incident, even with occasional leaks.  Therefore, the leaking of 
molten glass, unlike the GTE computer systems’ two-digit date limitation, is not a “seed 
of destruction” but part of the furnace’s normal functioning.  It is not an inherent vice.  
9 
 
Summary judgment on this ground was inappropriate.
3
  We will reverse the order 
granting summary judgment to US Fire on the breach of contract claim and remand the 
case to the District Court to grant judgment in favor of Kelman on the Inherent Vice 
Exclusion and to take further proceedings in regard to the other grounds for judgment 
asserted by US Fire.    
  b. Additional Coverage Extensions 
 The District Court held that the loss did not fall under the Additional Coverage 
Extensions because the policy unambiguously established that any loss that falls under an 
exclusion is not covered under the Additional Coverage Extensions.  Because we 
conclude that the Inherent Vice Exclusion does not apply here, there is at this point no 
bar to applying the Additional Coverage Extensions.  However, we do note that our 
review convinces us that the District Court may have erred in precluding an excluded loss 
from being covered by the Additional Coverage Extensions.  When an insurance policy 
contains general coverage provisions as well as a special coverage provision contained in 
an endorsement, it does not necessarily follow that the provisions of the main policy 
govern the endorsement.  An endorsement to a policy may in fact provide coverage that is 
excluded by the language of the main policy.  In this type of situation, we have held that 
“[i]f there is a conflict between the terms of an endorsement and those in the body of the 
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 US Fire additionally asserted that the loss is excluded under the Wear and Tear, 
Corrosion and Deterioration Exclusion, Faulty, Inadequate or Defective Maintenance 
Exclusion, and Inadequate or Defective Design Exclusion and that the loss is not covered 
because it was not fortuitous.  Because the District Court decided the case on the Inherent 




main policy, then the endorsement prevails, particularly when it favors the insured.”  St. 
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 655 F.2d 521, 524 (3d Cir. 1981);
4
 see 
also Whole Enchilada, Inc. v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am., 581 F. Supp. 2d 677, 691 
(W.D. Pa. 2008). 
 The endorsement in question here is the Additional Coverage Extensions which 
provide in pertinent part: 
F. Additional Coverage Extensions 
*  *  * 
2. Water Damage, Other Liquids, Powder or Molten Material 
Damage 
 If loss or damage caused by or resulting from covered water 
or other liquid, powder or molten material damage loss occurs, we 
will also pay the cost to tear out and replace any part of the building 
or structure to repair damage to the system or appliance from which  




  The District Court reasoned that a “covered . . . molten material 
damage loss” under the Additional Coverage Extensions must fall within the policy’s 
definition for “Covered Causes of Loss.”  This is not an accurate reading of the policy.  
In dropping the “water or other liquid, powder or” language between “covered” and 
“molten material,” the District Court gave an unjustifiably expansive modifying power to 
the word “covered.”  The more reasonable interpretation is that “covered” does not 
modify “molten material” but modifies only “water” because “covered” is next to 
“water,” and “or” is used twice, along with a comma, in the phrase to separate the other 
elements (“or other liquid, powder or molten material”) from “water.”  See Antonin 
                                              
4
 We note that neither party cited this case in its briefing of this appeal. 
5
 The record reflects that US Fire was given consideration for the Additional Coverage 
Extensions, and therefore the Additional Coverage Extensions qualify as an endorsement. 
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Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 153 (2012) 
(“When syntax involves something other than a parallel series of nouns or verbs, a 
prepositive or postpositive modifier normally applies only to the nearest reasonable 
referent.”).   
 The importance of expressing whether or not “water” damage is “covered” can be 
seen from the fact that only certain types of water damage are covered by the policy.  In 
the “Exclusions” Section B.1.g., it is specified that “water” damage loss caused by flood, 
surface water, waves, tides, tidal waves, overflow of any body of water, or their spray, 
mudslide, mudflow, water overflow from a sewer, drain, or sump, etc., is not covered.  
Because of the extensive range of “not covered” water losses, it makes sense that the 
drafter of the Additional Coverage Extensions language wanted to expressly limit 
recovery for water damage under the Additional Coverage Extensions to “covered” water 
damage.      
 In addition, there is no indication that “loss” in the Additional Coverage 
Extensions is the same as “loss” as defined in “Covered Causes of Loss.”  It is not clear 
whether the loss in question must fall within the definition of “Covered Causes of Loss,” 
as the District Court held, or if any type of loss or damage is sufficient to trigger the 
Additional Coverage Extensions.  Indeed, the fact that the Additional Coverage 
Extensions simply states “loss or damage” rather than “Covered Causes of Loss” suggests 
that the Additional Coverage Extensions contemplate insurance coverage for a broader 
category of losses than the defined term of “Covered Causes of Loss.”  
  2. Breach of Contract Claim Against Continental 
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 Kelman also argues that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment for 
Continental on the breach of contract claim.  Because we find that there is an issue of 
material fact regarding whether the loss was covered under Continental’s “Equipment 
Breakdown” policy, we hold that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment. 
 Under Continental’s “Equipment Breakdown” policy, Kelman is entitled to 
coverage when a breakdown in its equipment occurs.  The policy defines “Breakdown” as 
“sudden and accidental direct physical loss to ‘Covered Equipment.’”6  Consistent with 
other cases applying Pennsylvania law, the District Court interpreted “sudden” and 
“accidental” as meaning, respectively, “abrupt” and “unexpected or unintended.”  See, 
e.g., Cyclops Corp. v. Home Ins. Co., 352 F. Supp. 931, 934-37 (W.D. Pa. 1973); Lower 
Paxton Twp. v. U.S. Fire & Guar. Co., 557 A.2d 393, 397-98 (Pa. Super. 1989).  Because 
the District Court found that Kelman expected leaks to occur, the District Court held that 
the loss in question was not “sudden and accidental” and thus was not covered under 
Continental’s “Equipment Breakdown” policy.   
 The District Court’s reasoning is erroneous.  Despite recognizing that the relevant 
question is whether the nature of the loss, and not its underlying cause, was “sudden and 
accidental,” the District Court based its holding on a finding that Kelman expected the 
leaks.  However, whether or not a leak—allegedly the cause of the loss—was expected is 
not indicative of whether the loss was “sudden and accidental.”  Thus, the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment on the grounds that the loss was expected cannot be 
sustained. 
                                              
6
 The parties do not dispute that the furnace qualified as “Covered Equipment.”   
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Furthermore, there exist material issues of fact as to whether the loss here was 
“sudden and accidental.”  The District Court held that Kelman expected the incident to 
occur based on the previous leaks that had occurred in the furnace and the furnace 
manager’s statements expressing concern about the risk of another leak occurring.  In so 
holding, the District Court overlooked two critical points.  First, there are factual issues 
that remain as to exactly what Kelman expected.  The furnace manager’s concerns about 
potential leaks appear to have been about a part of the furnace different from the location 
of the leak on March 15, 2011.  Further, while Kelman admitted that leaks in the furnace 
would happen, the anticipated severity of those leaks is in dispute.  Thus, at the very 
least, there are factual issues as to what risks of loss and damage Kelman expected.   
Second, Kelman proffered evidence suggesting that the March 15, 2011, incident 
was, in fact, “sudden and accidental.”  Reports from Continental state that “this was 
definitely an occurrence that was sudden and accidental.”  Continental argues that this 
evidence is not trustworthy, but, at a minimum, viewing this evidence in the light most 
favorable to Kelman, it is sufficient to show that there is a material issue of fact as to 
whether the incident was sudden and accidental.   
Consequently, we will reverse the District Court’s entry of summary judgment for 
US Fire on the breach of contract claim and remand for further proceedings.  
 B. Kelman’s Bad Faith Claim Against US Fire 
 Kelman also argues that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment for 
US Fire on Kelman’s bad faith claim.  We disagree.  Under Pennsylvania law, an insured 
may recover damages against an insurer if the insurer has acted in bad faith.  To prevail 
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on a bad faith claim, the insured must prove two elements:  “(1) that the insurer did not 
have a reasonable basis for denying benefits under the policy; and (2) that the insurer 
knew of or recklessly disregarded its lack of a reasonable basis in denying the claim.”  
Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Babayan, 430 F.3d 121, 137 (3d Cir. 2005) (applying 
Pennsylvania law) (citation omitted).  “Although the insurer’s conduct need not be 
fraudulent, mere negligence or bad judgment is not bad faith.”  Id. (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted).  The insured must prove bad faith by clear and convincing 
evidence, and “the insured’s burden in opposing a summary judgment motion brought by 
the insurer is commensurately high because the court must view the evidence presented 
in light of the substantive evidentiary burden at trial.”  Id. (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  This heightened evidentiary standard requires “evidence so clear, 
direct, weighty and convincing as to enable a clear conviction, without hesitation, about 
whether or not the defendants acted in bad faith.”  Post v. St. Paul Travelers Ins. Co., 691 
F.3d 500, 523 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 Kelman brings four allegations of bad faith against US Fire:  (1) US Fire 
deliberately ignored facts that supported Kelman’s claim of coverage; (2) US Fire refused 
to evaluate coverage under the appropriate policy provisions; (3) US Fire refused to 
reevaluate its position after facts favorable to Kelman’s position emerged; and (4) US 
Fire’s conduct during the litigation forced Kelman to exhaust its financial resources.  The 
District Court held that Kelman’s success on the first and second allegations of bad faith 
was contingent on the outcome of the breach of contract claim against US Fire.  
Consequently, because US Fire prevailed on the contract issue, Kelman’s first two bad 
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faith allegations necessarily failed.  As to the third basis, the District Court held that 
Kelman proffered insufficient evidence to support its claim.  Finally, the District Court 
held that Kelman’s fourth basis was not actionable under Pennsylvania law. 
Notwithstanding our reversal of summary judgment on Kelman’s breach of 
contract claim, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment for US 
Fire on Kelman’s bad faith claim because Kelman cannot show clear and convincing 
evidence of bad faith for any of its four allegations of bad faith.  Kelman points to US 
Fire’s invocation of several exclusions when it denied Kelman’s claim—including the 
“Wear and Tear, Corrosion and Deterioration Exclusion,” “Faulty, Inadequate or 
Defective Maintenance Exclusion,” and “Inadequate or Defective Design Exclusion.”  
Kelman then asserts that several of US Fire’s experts conceded that their study of the 
furnace and the March 15, 2011, incident suggested that those exclusions did not apply.
7
  
Without more, this proffer would not allow a jury to conclude by clear and convincing 
evidence that US Fire’s denial of the claim was unreasonable or that US Fire knew or 
recklessly disregarded its lack of a reasonable basis to deny the claim.  See, e.g., Post, 
691 F.3d at 525 (affirming grant of summary judgment to insurer where insured failed to 
present clear and convincing evidence of bad faith).  The fatal defect in Kelman’s claim 
is that it relies on the absence of evidence of good faith rather than clear and convincing 
evidence of bad faith.  Consequently, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment to US Fire on Kelman’s bad faith claim. 
                                              
7
 Kelman also asserts that US Fire ignored notice from Kelman that its furnace had been 
rebuilt between late 2003 and early 2004.  It is not clear how or why this fact affects the 
bad faith analysis. 
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C. Denial of Motion for Leave to Amend Kelman’s Third Party  
Complaint Against Continental 
 
Finally, Kelman argues that the District Court erred in denying its motion for leave 
to amend its third party complaint against Continental.  We agree. 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that “the court should freely give 
leave when justice so requires.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a).  However, a district court may 
deny leave to amend a complaint where it is apparent from the record that “(1) the 
moving party has demonstrated undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motives, (2) the 
amendment would be futile, or (3) the amendment would prejudice the other party.”  
Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 373 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 
182 (1962)).  We review a district court’s denial of leave to amend for abuse of 
discretion.  Bjorgung v. Whitetail Resort, LP, 550 F.3d 263, 266 (3d Cir. 2008).   
 Kelman moved for leave to amend its complaint to add a bad faith claim after 
Continental’s corporate designee’s February 2, 2012, deposition.  Kelman asserts that it 
learned at that time that Continental had, among other things, misrepresented in its April 
11, 2011, May 6, 2011, and June 9, 2011, letters that it was investigating Kelman’s claim 
when in fact it did no investigation into the claim between March 24, 2011 and June 24, 
2011.  The District Court denied Kelman’s motion on the grounds that (1) Kelman 
demonstrated undue delay in filing this motion on February 21, 2012 because Kelman 
received all of the information relevant to Continental’s investigation in December 2011 
when Continental produced its entire claim file pursuant Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
26; (2) allowing the amendment would prejudice Continental because it would require 
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discovery, which had closed on February 10, 2012, to be re-opened; and (3) the 
amendment would be likely be futile.  
 We hold that the District Court abused its discretion in denying Kelman’s motion 
for leave to amend.  First, Kelman did not demonstrate undue delay in filing the motion 
on February 21, 2012:  although Kelman had previously obtained Continental’s claim 
file, Kelman did not learn until February 2, 2012, that Continental falsely stated in its 
April 11, 2011, May 6, 2011, and June 9, 2011, letters that it was investigating Kelman’s 
claim.  Thus, Kelman was not aware of key facts underlying its bad faith claim until 
weeks before it filed the motion for leave to amend.  See Adams v. Gould, Inc., 739 F.2d 
858, 868 (3d Cir. 1984) (“The question of undue delay . . . requires that we focus on the 
[party’s] motives for not amending their complaint to assert this claim earlier . . ..”).  
 Second, we are not convinced that allowing the amendment would be substantially 
prejudicial to Continental:  Continental asserts generally that it would need additional 
discovery but does not identify any specific depositions or evidence that it would need to 
defend this claim.  See Bechtel v. Robinson, 886 F.2d 644, 652 (3d. Cir. 1989) (“This 
Court has interpreted these factors to emphasize that prejudice to the non-moving party is 
the touchstone for denial of the amendment.  But the non-moving party must do more 
than merely claim prejudice.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).   
 Third, the District Court, in finding that the amendment would be futile, failed to 
establish that the complaint as amended would fail to state a claim upon which relief 
could be granted.  See In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d 
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Cir. 1997) (“In assessing ‘futility,’ the district court applies the same standard of legal 
sufficiency as applies under Rule 12(b)(6).”).   
For these reasons, we hold that the District Court abused its discretion in denying 
Kelman’s motion for leave to amend its complaint against Continental. 
IV. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District Court’s April 5, 2012, order 
granting summary judgment in favor of US Fire on the Inherent Vice Exclusion and 
remand for further proceedings on the breach of contract claim.  We will reverse the 
District Court’s April 5, 2012, order, granting summary judgment in favor of Continental 
and remand for further proceedings.  We will affirm the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment in favor of US Fire on Kelman’s bad faith claim.  We will reverse the 
District Court’s March 1, 2012, order denying Kelman’s motion to amend its complaint 
against Continental and remand for further proceedings.   
